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It is now conventional wisdom that eyewitness identi-fications can be notoriously unreliable.1 But whatabout identifications by witnesses who believe the
perpetrator is someone familiar? Are their identifica-
tions reliable?
A. An Exemplar Case: 
State v. Guilbert
In 2007, a jury convicted Brady Guilbert of shoot-
ing three men in New London, Conn., two of them
fatally.2 The prosecution alleged that Guilbert shot one
man in a bar at around 1:00 a.m. on Oct. 9, 2004, and,
then, a few blocks away and five minutes later, shot two
others in the head while they sat in the front seat of a
parked car. Guilbert was convicted almost entirely on
the testimony of four alleged eyewitnesses. At trial,
Guilbert challenged the reliability of all of the eyewit-
ness identifications.
One witness was the man who was shot in the dimly
lit bar. He initially said he did not know who shot him,
later said it was Guilbert, with whom he had a previous
altercation, and still later denied making any identifica-
tion at all. The second witness emerged from the bar
restroom after the shooting and saw the shooter only
briefly. That witness came forward 10 days later, after
seeing a newspaper article about the shooting that
included Guilbert’s photograph. 
The two other witnesses — both of whom identi-
fied Guilbert as the assailant in the car shooting — also
did not come forward until after reading the news story
with Guilbert’s photograph. Both of these witnesses
were also cousins of one of the victims and claimed they
were acquainted with Guilbert. One said Guilbert lived
with her family when she was younger, and the other
said Guilbert had been a regular customer at Dunkin’
Donuts when she worked there months earlier.3
Guilbert’s lawyers unsuccessfully attempted to call
an expert witness to testify about factors that might
affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications. In dis-
allowing the expert testimony, the court reasoned that
the reliability of eyewitness identifications — including
the effect of a witness’s prior familiarity with the alleged
perpetrator — was within the “common knowledge” of
the members of the jury, which made expert testimony
unnecessary.4
This article refutes the “common knowledge”
approach. Absent expert guidance, jurors will likely be
misled by their commonly held — but incorrect —
beliefs and assumptions. Indeed, the Guilbert court’s
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core reasoning in denying the request
for expert testimony — that any con-
cerns about the reliability of eyewitness
identifications are eliminated when an
eyewitness is “familiar” with the identi-
fied person — is a stunning example of
a commonly held but incorrect assump-
tion. Scientifically-designed research
studies have consistently shown that
prior familiarity can adversely affect the
reliability of an eyewitness identifica-
tion in nuanced, complex, and often
counterintuitive ways. In short, famil-
iarity does not guarantee reliability. 
B. Familiarity and
Facial Recognition
The recognition and identification
of familiar faces has been the focus of a
number of scholarly studies in the fields
of psychology and neuroscience.5 As a
general matter, the accuracy of facial
recognition and identification increases
as a function of familiarity: ceteris
paribus, people can recognize their own
faces better than those of celebrities, the
faces of celebrities better than those of
acquaintances, and those of acquain-
tances better than those of strangers.6
Within this general framework, howev-
er, empirical findings have painted an
unexpectedly intricate and less straight-
forward picture.
Research shows that, counterintu-
itively, identifications of familiar faces
— as with identifications of unfamiliar
faces — are influenced by a host of vari-
ables, including interaction time, con-
textual information, expectation, post-
event information, and own-race bias.
By changing how the brain perceives
and processes interactions, these vari-
ables simultaneously increase the prob-
ability that an individual will identify a
given face as familiar and inflate the
individual’s confidence in the identifica-
tion, regardless of whether the face in
fact is familiar or the identification
accurate.
1. Factors That Interact With
Familiarity to Produce
Counterintuitive Results
The most obvious and relevant dif-
ference between stranger and non-
stranger identifications is pre-event
exposure time: previous interaction
with a person is a prerequisite for famil-
iarity, or “non-stranger identifications,”
but a negating condition for identifica-
tion of strangers (i.e., if one had a previ-
ous interaction with someone, that per-
son is “familiar” and no longer a
stranger). As a matter of common sense,
the more time spent interacting with a
person, the more thoroughly the unique
physical characteristics of that person
should be encoded, thus producing
more accurate recognition and identifi-
cation. To a degree, this intuitive
assumption is confirmed by science:
increased interaction time does seem to
produce marginally more accurate iden-
tifications.7
However, a larger and more coun-
terintuitive result also stems from
increased interaction time: a greater
incidence of false positives — that is, a
propensity of the witness to incorrectly
select strangers’ photographs from line-
ups, whether or not the lineup contains
the familiar person’s photograph.8 This
counterintuitive relationship was most
clearly demonstrated in a 1995 experi-
ment that examined the effect of
increased interaction time on store
clerks’ ability to accurately recognize
and identify a female target.9 Half of the
clerks spoke with the female target for
30-60 seconds (“short-interaction”
clerks); the other half were interviewed
by the female target for between four
and 12 minutes (“long-interaction”
clerks). Two days later, all clerks were
asked to pick out the targets’ photo-
graphs in various photographic lineups;
some lineups contained the targets’
photos (target-present), while others
did not (target-absent).10
On the whole, the most reliable
effect of increased exposure to the
female target was the clerks’ greater will-
ingness to identify someone from the
lineups, but their choices were wholly
unrelated to increased ability to choose
the correct photograph.11 For both tar-
get-present and target-absent lineups,
the long-interaction clerks more often
erroneously picked the photograph of a
stranger as the interviewer. Moreover,
the long-interaction clerks’ perform-
ance deteriorated most severely — and
most disturbingly for eyewitness identi-
fication purposes — in target-absent
lineups: the percentage of clerks who
incorrectly said the target was present
more than doubled as their interaction
time with the female target increased.12
This increase in misidentifications was
“entirely attributable” to the clerks’
increased propensity to select a
stranger’s photograph.13
The unexpected results of this
study are explained by the effect of
increased exposure on the clerks’ self-
perception.14 The clerks who had inter-
acted with the target for a longer period
of time were more confident that the
exposure equipped them to make an
identification; as a result, they more fre-
quently chose a photograph from the
lineup. Unfortunately, they were mis-
taken about the effect of their prior
exposure to the subject. Although long-
interaction clerks were able to report a
greater aggregate quantity of informa-
tion about the target, the absolute quan-
tity of correct information was the same
for both long- and short-interaction
clerks. Simply put, increased interaction
time causes people to think they
remember more about a familiar per-
son’s physical appearance than they
actually do. That assumption more
often leads them to conclude erro-
neously that a stranger who looks famil-
iar is, in fact, the familiar person.
Whereas increased interaction time
increases false-positive identifications
by altering self-perception, context
increases false positives through uncon-
scious, associative distortions. In partic-
ular, subconscious expectations and the
presentation of contextual information
— such as information about the per-
son’s background, personality, or the
circumstances in which the person is
typically encountered — serve as “prim-
ing” mechanisms that increase the iden-
tifier’s confidence to make an identifica-
tion and the probability that the identi-
fication will be wrong.15
This context effect is due largely to
the unique cognitive processes that
underlie how one recognizes familiar
faces. Neuroscientific findings suggest
that the successful recognition of famil-
iar faces involves not only visual famil-
iarity, but also emotional responses and
“person knowledge” stored in long-term
memory (e.g., personal traits, biograph-
ic information, and episodic memories
associated with the individual).16
Consequently, problems with any one of
these streams can negatively impact
familiar face recognition. Moreover, the
intermingling of processing streams
sometimes allows increased input from
one stream to hijack the other streams,
producing unexpected results.
The “availability heuristic” (cogni-
tive reliance on a rule-of-thumb to
make judgments) is an example of such
hijacking. The availability heuristic
causes people to assume that there is a
direct relationship between how they
think about an event and how the event
likely occurred; the brain uses
“strength of association as a basis for
the judgment of frequency” without
assessing actual probability.17 For
example, one may judge the likelihood
that a particular suspect is guilty of a
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crime by scanning one’s own mind for
similar instances or associations, as a
shortcut for assessing the actual cir-
cumstances surrounding the crime.
The availability heuristic has been well-
documented in other recall-based
tasks.18 As applied to facial recognition,
the availability heuristic predicts that
“enhanced contextual information
increase[s] the ease of recall of infor-
mation about the target … and that
this familiarity [i]s misattributed to
perceptual familiarity.”19 Expectation
similarly “raises the basic activation
level of the face recognition unit” of
the brain to enhance the ease of recall
and produce the same misattribution
effect.20 Thus, because information
about a familiar individual’s identity is
already stored in an identifier’s brain,
both contextual information and
expectations triggered by surroundings
or circumstances associated with the
familiar person “prime” the identifier’s
brain to more likely misidentify a
stranger as the familiar person.
2. Irrespective of
Familiarity, Other Factors
Also Significantly Affect
The Reliability of
Eyewitness Identification
Although there are unique cogni-
tive processes that affect familiar eye-
witness identifications, there also are
some cognitive processes implicated in
all facial recognition, regardless of
familiarity.21 Both mundane and less
obvious factors have been shown unex-
pectedly to affect the accuracy of all
eyewitness identifications. These
include situational factors, the typicali-
ty effect, own-race bias, and the inaccu-
racy of eyewitness confidence. The
effects of post-event contextual infor-
mation discussed below can also apply
to the identification of strangers and
non-strangers alike.22
For commonplace situational fac-
tors like poor viewing conditions and
facial typicality, what is surprising is the
magnitude of the deleterious effects. In
one study, bad lighting and partially
concealing the subject’s face and hair
reduced correct identifications of
known subjects by 18 percent.23
The “typicality effect” makes indi-
viduals more likely to misidentify a typ-
ical but unfamiliar face as familiar than
to misidentify an atypical familiar
face.24 This occurs because “increased
typicality is associated with increased
general familiarity and decreased mem-
orability.”25 Moreover, “familiarity aris-
ing from some specific prior exposure
is not intrinsically separable from the
structurally induced familiarity that
arises from a lifetime of experience
with similar exemplars.”26
Less obvious phenomena — e.g.,
the own-race bias (ORB) effect (i.e.,
more accurate identifications of people
among a witness’s own race) — may
also affect both familiar and unfamiliar
face recognition. The ORB effect is
resilient and pronounced. It occurs
across memory tasks (e.g., face recogni-
tion, face matching, and lineup identifi-
cations), is resistant to time and famil-
iarity manipulations, and is replicable
in a wide variety of experimental set-
tings.27 In a meta-analysis of 91 studies
reported in 39 research articles, ORB
was found consistently to decrease cor-
rect identifications and increase false-
positive identifications.28
Finally, it is now well-established
that eyewitness confidence (i.e., in the
accuracy of their own identification) is
an unreliable predictor of actual accu-
racy across the board.29 This kind of
confidence is different than the confi-
dence (discussed above) that the wit-
ness will be able to make an identifica-
tion at all, but similarly creates poten-
tial for error in identifications and sub-
sequent prosecutions of suspects.
Conclusion
Empirical evidence and an array of
DNA exonerations have confirmed that
familiarity does not eliminate misiden-
tification problems. Even with familiar
faces, people are significantly worse at
recognizing faces than they expect.
Given this fact, some courts recognize
the importance of cautionary expert
testimony concerning the reliability of
eyewitnesses.30 But, when “familiarity”
is involved in an identification, courts
often fail to allow expert testimony,
instead clinging to the belief that eye-
witness testimony “is particularly valu-
able where … lay witnesses are able to
make the challenged identifications
based on their familiarity with charac-
teristics of the defendant. …”31
Tragically, this erroneous presumption
has significantly contributed to wrong-
ful convictions.32
Among DNA exoneration cases in
which erroneous eyewitness identifica-
tions were implicated, several involved
misidentifications by witnesses, other
than accomplices, who were familiar or
acquainted with the suspect.33 In the
case of Mark Diaz Bravo, for example,
the rape victim, a manic-depressive dis-
order patient in a Los Angeles psychi-
atric hospital where Bravo worked as a
nurse, identified him by name as the
assailant and later identified him in
court.34 In addition to the eyewitness
identification, Bravo previously had fal-
sified his qualifications on applications
and business cards, and had a rare
blood type that matched blood found
on the blanket where the rape occurred.
After three years in prison, however,
DNA testing on semen from the rape
exonerated Bravo.
Similarly, in Alexandria, Va., a jury
convicted Walter Snyder for rape and
sodomy on the basis of an identifica-
tion by the victim, who lived across the
street from Snyder.35 The victim identi-
fied Snyder in a police station “show-
up.” In addition, both Snyder and the
perpetrator were type A secretors.
Moreover, Snyder’s alibi was corrobo-
rated only by his mother. But after DNA
testing of semen found on a vaginal
swab from the original rape kit exclud-
ed Snyder, the governor of Virginia
granted Snyder an absolute pardon and
he was released from prison after serv-
ing seven years of his original sentence.
These and other cases apparently
involved honest mistakes by eyewit-
nesses whose identifications jurors
understandably might have assumed
were reliable. As this article shows,
however, such assumption may be mis-
placed.36 Consequently, courts should
recognize this danger and permit expert
testimony to assist the jury in properly
assessing the reliability of all eyewitness
evidence, regardless of whether the wit-
ness claimed the suspect was familiar.
The authors are greatly appreciative
of the valuable assistance of Julianna
Soic, a member of the 2012 Duke Law
School class, who helped with an earlier
related work.
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